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United States v. Stevens at 10:  
Adding a “Prurient Intent” Element to Resolve  
Constitutional Overbreadth in the Federal  
Anti-Animal Cruelty Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 48 
 
DALE RADFORD1 
 
Abstract 
 
Ten years ago, in United States v. Stevens, the United States Supreme 
Court overturned the federal anti-animal cruelty statute 18 U.S.C. § 48 for 
the first time.  The statute was specifically drafted to target the clandestine 
underground production of so-called “crush videos,” adult entertainment 
videos depicting animals being purposefully tortured to death by scantily 
clad women.  
The Court overturned the statute for potentially criminalizing portrayals 
of legal activity with redeeming socio-cultural value, such as hunting.  While 
the Court relied heavily on analyzing speech as it relates to child 
pornography, it did not address whether depictions of animal torture 
constitute “obscenity” outside the protection of the First Amendment.  Even 
after the statute was narrowed in 2010 following the Stevens decision, it was 
again criticized in 2014 and 2017 at the appellate level for criminalizing 
depictions that did not explicitly contain “sexual conduct.” 
Today, the most current revision to 18 U.S.C. § 48 (2019), titled the 
“Preventing Animal Cruelty and Torture Act,” is still not strong enough to 
accomplish its intended purpose of preventing depictions of animal cruelty.  
The statute as written prohibits the sale of “obscene” depictions in interstate 
commerce yet lacks a useful way to interpret exactly what types of content 
that applies to.  This means the statute has a much greater chance of being 
challenged by a future court on the basis of constitutional overbreadth.  To 
address this, this article proposes two additional changes which would both 
 
 1. J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2019, B.A., University 
of California, Los Angeles, 2013.  I would like to thank my Professor, Jessica Vapnek, for 
mentoring me as a legal writer and critical thinker throughout my last two years of law school. 
Finally, a special thank you to all members of the Hastings Journal of Crime and Punishment 
Volume 1, 2019-2020, for their tremendous efforts. 
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strengthen its enforcement and improve its likelihood of passing 
constitutional muster.  First, this Article argues that re-classifying crush 
videos sold for profit under “commercial speech” would make it easier to 
regulate because commercial speech based on the commission of underlying 
criminal acts is illegal. Second, this article proposes enhancing the scienter 
language of 18 U.S.C. § 48 with a “prurient intent” element, requiring 
prosecutors to demonstrate that a particular depiction was made for 
“prurient” purposes.  Because courts would have to closely examine the 
purpose and intent motivating production of crush video depictions, this 
would reduce the likelihood of criminalizing protected speech. The statute 
would therefore be more likely to pass constitutional muster. 
This Article has six parts to support its argument.  First, it examines the 
background and legislative history of the federal anti-animal cruelty statute, 
18 U.S.C. § 48, including weaknesses of subsequent amendments.  Second, 
the Article dissects both the majority and dissenting opinions of Stevens to 
show how the Supreme Court departed from traditional obscenity analysis in 
refusing to find the conduct compelling enough to ban outright.  Third, to 
show how the Court could have approached the obscenity issue, this Article 
discusses First Amendment speech analysis as it relates to regulating 
depictions of obscene speech in commercial contexts and on the internet.  
Fourth, this Article reviews other federal and state court interpretations of 
statutes criminalizing the dissemination of obscene materials to show that 
there were other options available aside from invalidating for overbreadth.  
Fifth, this Article argues that re-classifying crush videos sold for profit under 
“commercial speech” would make it easier to regulate than creating a new 
category of unprotected speech because commercial speech based on the 
commission of underlying criminal acts is illegal.  Sixth, this Article 
proposes that enhancing the scienter language of 18 U.S.C. § 48 with a 
“prurient intent” element would strengthen the statute to pass judicial review 
by requiring prosecutors to use additional circumstantial evidence to 
demonstrate that a particular depiction was made for “prurient” purposes.  
Such closer examination into the purpose motivating production of crush 
video depictions would rule out criminalizing protected speech.  In addition, 
this Article discusses alternative remedies for animal abusers guilty under 18 
U.S.C. § 48 and beyond, and suggests a proactive, treatment-based approach 
to address reducing recidivism in lieu of traditional, reactive incarceration.  
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I. Introduction 
 
In early 2010 the Supreme Court decided United States v. Stevens,2 
holding that depictions of animal cruelty could not be criminalized under 18 
U.S.C. § 48 because the statute also penalized individuals who produced 
videos of injured animals for educational or hunting purposes.  In that case, 
dog trainer Robert Stevens was prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 48 for three 
videos he produced that showed dogs fighting one another and attacking a 
domestic pig.  In January 2005, he was found guilty in a district court for the 
Western District Court of Pennsylvania.  Stevens appealed to the Third 
Circuit.  That court subsequently vacated the lower court’s conviction on the 
basis that the statute itself was not narrowly tailored enough to pass strict 
scrutiny review, whereupon the government appealed the Supreme Court for 
final review.3 
The Supreme Court’s decision sent shockwaves through the animal 
rights’ legal community and beyond, as it affirmed that portrayals of animal 
cruelty could still be protected as “free speech” under the First Amendment.4  
Eight of the nine Supreme Court justices agreed to overturn 18 U.S.C. § 48, 
just 10 years since its enactment in 1999.5  The initial intent of Congress in 
drafting such a statute was to eliminate the distribution of depictions of 
extreme acts of animal cruelty, known colloquially as “animal crush 
videos.”6  Congress justified restricting this type of speech to stop the 
distribution of depictions for profit on the internet because state prosecutorial 
methods were largely ineffective.7  The Supreme Court majority critiqued 
the language of the statute for potentially criminalizing too many actions not 
inherently obscene, finding it impermissibly overbroad.8  Justice Alito 
disagreed, arguing that protecting animals against wanton torture should 
serve as a compelling enough reason to uphold Stevens’s convictions for 
selling videos of dog fights.9 
Unfortunately, a community of online underground purveyors of 
“animal crush” videos still thrives today, even somewhat revived since the 
Stevens decision.  Forums such as Reddit and counterculture site 4Chan have 
 
 2. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010). 
 3. United States v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218, 237 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 4. Id.; see generally Brief for The Humane Society of the United States as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner, United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (No. 08-769). 
 5. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 482 (2010). 
 6. 18 U.S.C. § 48 (1999). 
 7. 145 Cong. Rec. H10267 (1999). 
 8. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 481–482.  
 9. Id. 
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made it easier than ever for users to find and download crush videos—often 
for a high price.10  Soon after Stevens, an investigation by the Humane 
Society of the United States revealed an uptick in the use of internet-based 
payment services such as PayPal and Western Union to facilitate the selling 
of crush videos online.11 
Historically, prosecuting the individuals responsible for the distribution 
of videos in commerce was difficult, even though nearly every state bans the 
act of animal abuse in itself.12  This is because applying any single state law 
that prohibits the selling of animal crush videos is unconstitutional given the 
interstate nature of the transactions.13 In reaction to this difficulty, legislators 
passed the “Preventing Animal Cruelty and Torture Act,”14 which aims to 
complement state anti-animal cruelty laws by making the distribution of 
animal crush videos “in or affecting interstate commerce” a Federal crime.15 
The biggest problem with the latest version of the statute, however, is that 
individuals may still use loopholes in the vague language of the Act to legally 
produce and sell crush videos.  This is because the language of the Act as 
written does not make it easy to distinguish obscene depictions of animal 
cruelty from other recognized categories of obscene speech.  
 
II. Background 
 
A. The Origins of 18 U.S.C. § 48 (1999) 
 
Explicit depictions of animal cruelty in which small animals are 
harmed, tortured, or killed for the sexual gratification of viewers have existed 
since the 1950s, but became most apparent during the late 1990s when an 
underground community began distributing such video depictions for profit 
over the internet.16  Between 1997 and 2000, the Humane Society of the 
United States located 2,000 animal crush videos available for sale between 
 
 10. REDDIT (July 18, 2018, 11:43 AM), https://www.reddit.com/r/insanepeopleface 
book/comments/8zy71x/i_will_pay_you_15000_if_you_brutally_kill_a_tiny/. 
 11. Prohibiting Obscene Animal Crush Videos in the Wake of United States v. Stevens 
Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/ 
pkg/CHRG-111shrg64411/html/CHRG-111shrg64411.htm. 
 12. H.R. Rep. No. 106-397 (1999). 
 13. Id. at 2 (“As Congress alone has the power to regulate interstate commerce . . .”). 
 14. Laws That Protect Animals, ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, https://aldf.org/pro 
ject/preventing-animal-cruelty-and-torture-pact-act/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2020). 
 15. 145 Cong. Rec. H10267 (1999). 
 16. Edward Wong, Long Island Case Sheds Light on Animal-Mutilation Videos, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 25, 2000), at B4. 
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$30 to $300 each.17  One estimate gauged the profits of crush videos at just 
under $1 million annually.18  Prior to the existence of a federal law which 
imposed a felony-level charge, those who produced crush videos for 
commercial gain were only charged with misdemeanor animal abuse.19 
Even as awareness of crush videos spread beyond the insular 
communities, not much could be done by state jurisdictions to prohibit sales 
over the internet.  In 1999, members of Congress drafted bill H.R. 1887 to 
curb the production of “crush” videos in the United States and sold online by 
criminalizing any depiction of “intentional killing” and general torture.20  
The legislative history of the 1999 version of the statute highlights the 
difficulties of prosecuting a two-fold crime that one, involved the underlying 
conduct often taking place in private, and two, targeted audiences almost 
entirely online. 
Congress’s deliberations on H.R. 1887 in 1999 demonstrated the need 
for regulating the distribution of obscene or prurient material at the advent 
of the internet.21  That year, Congress passed 18 U.S.C. § 48, criminalizing 
acts of knowingly creating, selling, or possessing only depictions capturing 
animal cruelty, with the intention of placing the video into “interstate or 
foreign commerce” for profit.22  18 U.S.C. § 48 even specifically exempted 
depictions made for “serious religious, political, scientific, educational, 
journalistic, historical, or artistic value” as a preliminary attempt to avoid 
criminalizing free speech.23  When President Bill Clinton signed the bill, he 
was aware that the statute posed a First Amendment conflict and explicitly 
 
 17. Id. 
 18. Press Release, The Humane Society of the United States, Animal Crush Videos: 
Senate Committee Testimony (Sept. 15, 2010), https://www.humanesociety.org/news/ani 
mal-crush-videos-senate-committee-testimony. 
 19. Id. 
 20. To Amend Title 18, United States Code, To Punish the Depiction of Animal Cruelty, 
H.R. 1887, 106th Cong. (1999) (enacted); see also Animal Crush Video Prohibition Act of 
2010, H.R. 5566, 111th Cong. (2010). 
 21. 145 Cong. Rec. H10267 (1999).  The House of Representatives heard testimony by 
Bill advocate and Ventura County Deputy District Attorney Tom Connors (one of several 
Deputy District Attorneys responsible for prosecuting animal abuse cases to testify), who 
described crush video clips produced by “Steponit Productions.”  The production company 
was responsible for distributing clips featuring a woman in boots or high heels speaking in a 
sexually suggestive manner while slowly crushing small mammals.  Connors argued that 
prosecuting depictions was nearly impossible given the difficulty locating offenders inside 
the three-year statute of limitations of many states’ laws.  Connors lauded H.R. 1887 for 
concentrating on reducing the commercial incentive of making profits post-production by 
criminalizing the possession and distribution of the videos.  Id. 
 22. 18 U.S.C. § 48(a)-(c) (1999) (emphasis added). 
 23. Id. 
4 - Radford_HJCP_V1-2 5/13/2020  11:38 AM 
226 Hastings Journal of Crime and Punishment [Vol. 1:2 
called for only video depictions capturing “wanton cruelty to animals 
designed to appeal to a prurient interest in sex,” taken as a whole, to apply 
under the statute.24  By the mid-2000s, the original sponsors of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 48 stated the prevalence of animal crush videos was considerably 
declining.25 
The first federal statute was not without complications, however. In the 
years following enactment, applying 18 U.S.C. § 48 proved to be difficult in 
one regard because it contained certain words such as “animal” which varied 
so widely in definition.26  For instance, the House Committee intended 
“animal” to be defined according to its common, rather than scientific name, 
but because many states have their own definition and a minority of states 
even limit the definition of animal to only “domestic animals,” application 
of the statute was not entirely clear.27 
 
B. The Argument against Robert J. Stevens  
 
In 2004 Robert J. Stevens, owner of a production company “Dogs of 
Velvet,” was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 48 after a federal and state 
investigation concluded that he had been producing and disseminating 
videos of pit bulls fighting for money and training to hunt dogs.28  Stevens 
was charged because the statute’s broad definition of animal “cruelty” also 
criminalized purposeful conduct that resulted in “serious bodily injury” of a 
nonhuman animal, which included selling depictions of animal fights.29  The 
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania denied Stevens’s 
motion to dismiss, and a jury unanimously convicted him of three counts of 
“knowing distribution of depictions of animal cruelty.”30  Stevens was 
sentenced to thirty-seven months in prison for violating the statute. Stevens 
 
 24. 1999 U.S.C.C.A.N. 324, 1999 WL 33178029; see also Cassuto, David N., United 
States v. Stevens: Win, Loss, or Draw for Animals?, 2 J. ANIMAL ETHICS 12 (2012). 
 25. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 492; see also Animal Cruelty, FREEDOM OF SPEECH (Mar. 18, 
2016), https://sites.psu.edu/2civichofman/2016/03/18/animal-cruelty/. 
 26. Emma Ricaurte, Comment, Son of Sam and Dog of Sam: Regulating Depictions of 
Animal Cruelty Through the Use of Criminal Anti-Profit Statutes, 16 ANIMAL L. 171, 179 
(2009). 
 27. H.R. Rep. 106-397 (1999); see also Ricaurte, supra note 26, at 178. 
 28. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 466; Recent Case, United States v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (en banc), 122 HARV. L. REV. 1239 (2009); see also Stevens, 533 F.3d at 221 
(describing Stevens selling videos under the guise of “dog training” to avoid getting caught, 
even though one such particularly disturbing video showed a dog attacking a domestic pig as 
a “training” exercise). 
 29. 18 U.S.C.A. § 48 (1999); see also Stevens, 533 F.3d at 218. 
 30. Recent Case, supra note 28, at 1240. 
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appealed on the basis that the statute was on its face overbroad and 
criminalized or deterred legitimate forms of speech that involved killing 
animals.31  
In its petition for certiorari, the government emphasized the statute as 
intended was to reinforce state law bans, and that the Court should focus on 
the fact that the “harm from continued sale of the material so outweighs the 
value of the material that it is appropriate to prohibit . . . such material in [its] 
entirety.”32  The Government remained adamant that the risk of criminalizing 
protected speech was minimal and did not justify entirely invalidating the 
statute.33 
The Supreme Court granted review on April 20, 2009.34  On behalf of 
the majority, Chief Justice Roberts first emphasized that the Court’s decision 
did not limit the ability to prohibit acts of animal cruelty.35  Rather, Roberts 
argued it lacked substantial justification to prohibit such speech when acts of 
depiction not “intrinsically related” to the underlying dangerous or criminal 
conduct itself.36  Thus, Roberts rejected the Government’s argument that 
depictions of animal cruelty belong in a class of unprotected speech, because 
portrayals of an illegal underlying act of cruelty depart too far from 
traditional First Amendment recognized classes of obscenity or the 
incitement of violence. This was because the majority largely disregarded 
the Chaplinsky balancing test,37 choosing instead to give much greater 
weight to the five-factor Ferber test designed specifically to evaluate 
depictions of child pornography.38  Ferber, which was decided over forty 
years later, presented a unique set of facts that prompted the Court to do more 
 
 31. Bond, Jessica, Some Thoughts for Animal Lovers (and First Amendment 
Aficionados) in the Wake of United States v. Stevens, 90 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 59, 66 (citing 
Stevens, 559 U.S. at 481–483). 
 32. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, United States v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218 (3rd Cir. 
2008) (No. 08-769).  
 33. Id. 
 34. United States v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218 (3d Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 556 U.S. 1181 
(U.S. April 20, 2009) (No. 08-769). 
 35. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 474–475. 
36 United States v. Stevens, THE MEDIA COALITION (May 15, 2013), https://www. 
mediacoalition.org/us-v-stevens/, (citing Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 471). 
 37. See id. at 470–471 (noting that the Court did not heavily weigh the “societal costs” 
of permitting a market of crush videos); see generally Chaplinsky v. United States, 315 U.S. 
568 (1942).  Chaplinsky established a more general “balancing” test that is applicable to 
measuring the social benefit of obscene speech against the societal interest of order and 
morality. 
 38. Recent Case, supra note 28, at 1245. 
4 - Radford_HJCP_V1-2 5/13/2020  11:38 AM 
228 Hastings Journal of Crime and Punishment [Vol. 1:2 
than a cost-benefit analysis.39  In that case, the Court classified depictions of 
child pornography on the basis that the material was “intrinsically related” 
to the underlying crime and harm to children.40 
Under Ferber, Roberts did not find criminalizing depictions of animal 
abuse to be intrinsically related to preventing animal cruelty.  Therefore, 
Roberts argued the regulated behavior did not rise to a level of “compelling” 
to justify criminalizing potentially legal speech and did not pass strict 
scrutiny.41  Many critics of the decision echoed Robert’s argument that the 
majority over-relied on the facts and reasoning of Ferber and under-relied 
on the past precedent of general obscenity case law allowed the Court make 
its decision based too closely on the facts of Ferber.42  Section D below will 
clarify how the Stevens Court departed from prior First Amendment 
precedent in deciding whether to classify categories of speech as protected. 
The Court invalidated the statute as overbroad but did not address 
whether the mere possession of depictions could be constitutionally 
criminalized.43  Invalidation was justified because the statute never required 
depictions of conduct to be “cruel,” rather that the conduct be “illegal” in 
any jurisdiction.44  This presented another issue of criminalizing conduct 
illegal in one jurisdiction but not another.  The Court was not persuaded by 
the government’s promise to use discretion in prosecuting only “extremely 
cruel” media, which would exclude videos for journalistic or historic 
purposes.45  The Court reasoned that the statute was “problematic” where the 
criminalization of depictions of wounded or killed animals since it too easily 
overextended to criminalize videos that did not involve intentional cruelty.  
The facts of Stevens were representative of this problem because the 
legislative history failed to articulate that the statute intended to target 
dogfighting videos.  The Court also dismissed the government’s argument 
that narrowing the statute’s application to a crime after-the-fact would 
impinge on the legislative branch powers as it would enable the enactment 
 
 39. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 471 (citing New York v. Ferber 458 U.S. 747, 763 (1982)). 
 40. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759. 
 41. See Stevens, 599 U.S. at 472 (noting that in the case of child pornography, a New 
York statute criminalizing the sale and possession of depictions of child pornography departed 
from the usual obscenity analysis because the depictions were so closely tied to the abuse of 
children, necessitating a compelling governmental interest in regulating intrastate commerce 
to prevent underlying acts). 
 42. See supra, note 28, at 1243. 
 43. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 460, 482. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
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of ambiguous laws that could be reinterpreted later in time.46  The decision 
left open the possibility that a future statute which is more narrowly tailored 
to address “crush videos” would be more constitutionally sound.47 
Justice Alito’s dissent criticized the Court for not determining whether 
Steven’s tape itself was illegal, nor for remanding back to the Third Circuit 
for reconsideration on the issue.48  According to Alito, depictions of animal 
crushing and torture deserves the same treatment as child pornography, given 
that the crimes are done strictly for the purpose of recording it.  Alito also 
highlighted the high social value of protecting animals, albeit not as 
compelling as protecting welfare of minors.49  Alito focused his argument on 
the majority’s approach to the issue of overbreadth, given that a statute is 
typically not overturned unless it is “substantially” overbroad.50  Alito 
criticized the majority for basing its overbreadth argument on the mere 
hypothetical chilling of legal speech rather than actual harm.  Alito cited 
Virginia v. Hicks to demonstrate this argument that a claimant must prove 
overbreadth from the “text of [the law] and from actual fact.”51  Alito also 
felt the Court had a duty to reasonably construe the statute narrowly, or in 
accordance with the intent of Congress, which was to clearly exclude 
individuals who possessed videos of hunting, one major concern of the 
majority.52  Alito was convinced that in the event a legal depiction was 
actually criminalized under § 48, it would be merely incidental, but not 
“substantial” enough to justify overbreadth as the majority feared it would.53 
Alito also demonstrated that the reasoning of Ferber, if applied more 
accurately to the facts of Stevens, could have resulted in upholding the statute 
because the distribution of obscene material is nearly inseparable from the 
underlying criminal acts that cannot be prevented any other way.54  Alito 
stressed that Congress was faced with only one choice: to ban commercial 
profit making of lucrative animal crush videos or tolerate the continuation of 
the underlying criminal acts.55  Finally, Alito recognized that the United 
 
 46. Id. at 480. 
 47. Id. at 482; see also David LaBahn, LEX CANIS: ASS’N OF PROSECUTING ATT’YS Q., 
Summer 2010 at 1, https://www.apa-inc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/LC-2.2.pdf.  
 48. Id. at 483 (Alito, S., dissenting). 
 49. Id. at 493–496. 
 50. Id. at 484. 
 51. Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 122 (2003) (citing N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of 
New York, 487 U.S. 1, 14 (1988)). 
 52. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 487, 490 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 53. Id. at 489. 
 54. Id. at 494. 
 55. Id. at 495. 
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States has a longstanding history of condemning intentional acts of cruelty 
thus speech depicting intentional cruelty to animals lacking any redeeming 
social value should not be protected.56 
The Stevens opinion was criticized not only for the misapplication of 
Ferber but also for disregarding the fact that the underlying conduct was 
nearly impossible to prosecute.57  Critics of the opinion expressed frustration 
as to why the Court invalidated the statute yet upheld depictions of 
recreational killing, given that depictions of recreational killing lacked 
enough “serious” value to be protected within one of the statute’s exceptions 
and were not protected as a fundamental right.58  This interpretation on behalf 
of the Court was very unusual because the Judicial branch typically must 
first determine the legislative intent of a statute prior to invalidating it on 
overbreadth grounds in order to determine whether the regulation is 
excessive in punishment.59  The Court’s decision not to classify depictions 
of torturous acts as a new category of obscenity speech due to the absence of 
an explicitly depiction of “sexual conduct,” as well as the lack of a prior 
“tradition” in doing so, was seen by some as an affront to the progress of 
animal rights.60 
Almost immediately after the decision was released, H.R. 5092 and 
H.R. 5337 were announced and garnered bipartisan support.61  The 
proponent behind H.R. 5092, Representative Gary Peters of Michigan, 
explained the urgency for Congress to enact the new narrower bill given the 
resurgence of the online community following the ruling.62  As a result of 
input from the hearing, H.R. 5566 was introduced in July 2010 by the House 
of Representatives unanimously as a way to address the Court’s main 
 
 56. Id. at 496. 
 57. Alison Frankel, Why violence, but not sex, is protected by the First Amendment, 
REUTERS (July 23, 2012), http://www.blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2012/07/23/why-vio 
lence-but-not-sex-is-protected-by-the-first-amendment/. 
 58. Harold Lloyd, Crushing Animals and Crashing Funerals: The Semiotics of Free 
Expression, 12 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 237, 266–267 (2012). 
 59. Meredith Shafer, Perplexing Precedent: United States V. Stevens Confounds A 
Century of Supreme Court Conventionalism and Redefines The Limits Of “Entertainment”, 
19 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 281, 296 (2012). 
 60. See Brief for the Humane Society of the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 
4; see also Stevens, 533 F. 3d at 237. 
 61. David LaBahn, LEX CANIS: ASS’N OF PROSECUTING ATT’YS Q., Summer 2010 Vol. 2 
Issue 2 at 1, https://www.apa-inc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/LC-2.2.pdf. 
 62. Id. 
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concerns.63  In September 2010, the Senate passed a reformed version of 
H.R. 5566 known as the Prevention of Interstate Commerce in Animal Crush 
Videos Act of 2010.64  This revised Act limited the statute language to “crush 
videos,” addressed conduct illegal under federal or state law, and introduced 
an exception that excluded various forms of hunting and agricultural 
practices.65  At the proceedings and debates of the 111th Congress (second 
session) Senator Patrick Leahy highlighted well-established First 
Amendment exceptions that would justify the constitutionality of passing a 
narrowed statute such as the prohibition of interstate sale of obscene 
materials and the compelling need to regulate speech integral to criminal 
conduct.66  The legislation was signed into law by President Barack Obama 
in December of 2010. 
Unlike the previous version of the law, P.L. 111-294 added a 
requirement to the statutory language that animal crush videos need to be 
“obscene.”67  This is significant because the Stevens Court, which heavily 
focused on Ferber, did not discuss the meaning of “obscene” as defined in 
Miller v. California, also known as the Miller test for obscenity.68  The Miller 
test for obscenity requires “obscene” material to depict sexual conduct.69 The 
Stevens reasoning was reflected heavily in the reasoning of Brown v. 
Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, which involved a statute that deliberately 
left out language that conduct must depict “sexual conduct.”70  In that case, 
the California law banning the sale of certain violent video games based its 
definition of “violent video game” on the Miller test, which argued for the 
creation of a new category of unprotected speech.  The Court held that 
because the law tried to create a new category of content-based regulation 
but was still too vague on the definition of “violent,” it was not compelling 
enough to pass strict scrutiny.71 
 
 63. KATHERINE A. RUANE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41457, BANNING CRUSH VIDEOS: 
LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO THE SUPREME COURT’S RULING IN U.S. V. STEVENS AND LINGERING 
FIRST AMENDMENT QUESTIONS 4 (2010). 
 64. 156 Cong. Rec. S7653, 7653-54 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2010) (statement of Sen. Durbin). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 7653-7654 (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
 67. Animal Crush Video Prohibition Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-294, 124 Stat. 3177. 
 68. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Brown v. Ent. Merchants Ass’n., 564 U.S. 788, 788-90 (2011). 
 71. Id. at 787. 
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As of early 2020, the latest update to 18 U.S.C. § 48 was introduced in 
the House on February 13, 2019, as H.R. 724.72  The bill expands the criminal 
provisions to include “intentional acts of crushing” but adds exceptions 
where a video is made for purpose of euthanizing an animal, necessary to 
protect life or property, or for scientific reasons.73  An additional subsection 
excludes “unintentional” depictions of where an animal is injured or killed.74  
Unfortunately, the language of the new statute does not sufficiently provide 
a more precise mechanism to determine what qualifies as “obscene.”75  The 
language fails to clarify how the criminalizing of intentional acts of animal 
crushing on a federal level should be distinguished from conduct that a court 
does not find to fall into an exception.  The bill passed the House and Senate 
without any changes to the language since its introduction and was signed 
into law on November 25, 2019, as the “Preventing Animal Cruelty and 
Torture Act.”  PACT focuses on prohibiting the sale of depictions in 
interstate commerce, rather than articulate what constitutes an “obscene” 
depiction.76 
 
C. Balancing the Interaction between the First Amendment, 
Obscene Speech, and Freedom of Religion 
 
The following section is a discussion of obscenity analysis generally 
and how it relates to Stevens, given that much of the Court’s reasoning in 
that decision was based on prior case law regarding laws that attempted to 
regulate obscene speech.77 
 
i. Regulating the Freedom of Speech and Categorizing “Obscene” 
Speech 
 
The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment prohibits the 
government from regulating speech on the basis of viewpoint and subject 
matter, in order to promote a marketplace of ideas and self-governance.78  
Roth v. United States was the first case to distinguish First Amendment 
 
 72. Preventing Animal Cruelty and Torture Act or the PACT Act, H.R. 724, 116th Cong. 
(2019). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Animal Crush Video Prohibition Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-294, 124 Stat. 3177. 
 77. Michael Reynolds, Depictions of the Pig Roast: Restricting Violent Speech Without 
Burning the House, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 341, 377–78 (2009). 
 78. U.S. Const. amend. I., cl.2. 
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protections from speech considered “obscene.”79  In 1948, the Court struck 
down as vague a section of the New York penal code that attempted to 
criminalize the possession or circulation of “obscene, lewd, lascivious … 
magazines,” in Winters v. New York.80  The court in Winters was concerned 
that the statute was too broad and abridged free speech by prohibiting the 
circulation of “stories of deeds or bloodshed or lust.”81 
Nearly thirty years later, the constitutional restriction for laws 
prohibiting the distribution of generally obscene materials was limited to 
materials of a “prurient” nature based on a three-part test.82  United States v. 
Miller involved the criminalization of dissemination of advertisements and 
brochures containing “adult material” mailed to recipients who found the 
images of fornication disturbing and alerted the police.83  The Court 
introduced a novel test to evaluate whether the regulating of “pornographic” 
conduct of the brochures was protected by the First Amendment.84  This new 
Miller test exempted any speech considered prurient and not containing 
serious “redeeming” purpose was not protected free speech under the First 
Amendment and further specified that “sexual conduct” could include 
representations of those sexual acts.85 
 
 79. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483, 488–89 (1957); see also Jacobellis v. 
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 188 (Stewart, J., concurring) (highlighting that obscenity does not have 
a bright line).  In the early days of obscenity recognition, distinguishing when protected 
speech crossed into obscenity was based on Justice Stewart’s “I know it when I see it” 
determination.  Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197; see also Regina v. Hicklin, (1868) L.R. 
3 Q.B. 360.  Whereas Roth was the first United States case to establish a common law standard 
of obscenity, Regina “allowed [potentially obscene] material to be judged merely by the effect 
of an isolated except upon particularly susceptible persons.”  Id. 
 80. See Winters v. N.Y., 333 U.S. 507 (1948).  Winters was among the first obscenity 
cases to discuss the constitutionality of laws prohibiting the distribution of generically 
obscene materials. 
 81. Id. at 518. 
 82. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 21 (1973). 
 83. Id. at 36.  Miller, who owned an adult-content printing company, was charged with 
violating a California penal code section criminalizing the intentional dissemination of any 
obscene matter. 
 84. Id. at 24, 36. 
 85. Id. at 24.  When offensive content satisfies all prongs of the Miller test, it is 
considered “obscene.”  That is, 1) that the average person applying contemporary standards 
would find that the work (considered in the whole) appeals to prurient interests, 2) whether 
the work depicts or describes in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct defined by the 
applicable state law, and 3) whether the work as a whole lacks serious literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value.  Id. at 21. 
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Nine years after United States v. Miller, the Court in New York v. Ferber 
declared depictions of child pornography unprotected speech.86  Ferber 
departed from the Miller three-prong test which was specifically based on 
laws regulating the depictions of pornographic content.  The Court described 
the need to greatly adjust the Miller test given the visual depictions of 
underage sexual exhibitions.87  The Ferber Court was satisfied with the 
connection between visual depictions and underlying conduct because the 
possibility of also prohibiting legal speech was de minimis, given the 
underlying criminal conduct lacked redeeming value.88 
The application of the Ferber analysis in Stevens ran contrary to other 
First Amendment cases decided around the same time including American 
Booksellers Foundation for Free Expression, et al. v. Ted Strickland, 
Richard Cordroy, et al.89  Following Ferber, the Court in Osbourne v. Ohio 
limited the child pornography exception to acts of mere possession but did 
not extend categorical protection to the mere possession of obscene 
materials.90  The Court in Osborne v. Ohio also upheld a law that 
criminalized any virtual depictions of child pornography.91  Ferber and 
Osborne both weighed the constitutionality of statutes that criminalized 
depictions and possession of child pornography statutes.  Unlike the 
reasoning in Stevens, the Court's reasoning undermined the statute for its 
hypothetical overbreadth, the Court in both Ferber and Osborne was 
reluctant to overturn the statutes entirely because of a small hypothetical 
number of depictions with value.92 
The progression of case law on depictions of obscene material from 
Winters to Miller to Ferber demonstrates that courts have been reluctant to 
consider depictions of criminal acts as “obscenity” unless the depiction 
concerns a crime of human interest, such as harm to children.  However, one 
 
 86. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 774 (1982).  Justice White found that the test for 
obscenity did not need to be equated with the prurient interests of the average person by a 
community standard, nor even be considered “as a whole.”  Id. at 764.  It was therefore held that 
visual depictions and communications of child pornography, even if not obscene, are not 
protected under the First Amendment because of the substantial link to child abuse.  Id. at 773. 
 87. Id. at 764.  A New York statute was upheld for prohibiting persons from promoting 
sexual performances by children under the age of sixteen by restricting the distribution of 
material depicting those performances. 
 88. Id. at 756. 
 89. See generally Am. Booksellers Found. for Free Expression v. Strickland, 560 F.3d 
443 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 90. See generally Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990), and Stanley v. Georgia, 394 
U.S. 557, 564–568 (1969). 
 91. Osborne, 495 U.S. 103. 
 92. See supra, notes 86 and 90. 
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problem in extending the Miller obscenity framework to cases involving the 
distribution of obscene content is the challenge of developing a singular 
objective “contemporary community standard”93 by which to evaluate the 
conduct.94  Thus, it is difficult to interpret a federal law such as 18 U.S.C.  
§ 48 given the dynamic contemporary community standards of the internet.95  
Recall Justice Alito dissented that there is a strong connection between 
regulating depiction of videos in order to target the underlying crime.  
Therefore, depictions of animal crush or cruelty may easily be taken out of 
context without the presence of additional language to clarify that only 
specific content which applies to “prurient interests” should be regulated by 
18 U.S.C. § 48.  The fact that the current amended version of 18 U.S.C. § 48 
still lacks a limiting instruction that a particular depiction be “taken as a 
whole” by a court indicates the statute remains weak. 
A limiting instruction would remedy over-inclusiveness so that a 
depiction be “taken as a whole.”  Under such an instruction, depictions of 
intentional cruelty to animals would only be viewed as “criminal” under 18 
U.S.C. § 48 if the primary purpose of the Act targets creation for prurient 
interests, or can be exempted by serving a culturally significant purpose.  It 
is important to note that the addition of such narrowing language would 
likely exclude depictions of dogfighting or cockfighting, the conduct that 
Stevens was arrested for filming. 
 
ii. Anti-Animal Cruelty Statutes and the Freedom of Religion 
 
Preventing animal cruelty and preserving the freedom of religion 
presents a unique problem for courts in deciding cases because it involves 
prosecuting intentional acts of abuse that are codified as illegal but are 
essential practices in some religions.  Like laws regulating free speech, laws 
aimed at limiting religious practices must also meet strict scrutiny.  The 
 
 93. Miller, 413 U.S. at 30.  Recall that Roth and subsequently Miller adopted the 
“community standard” requirement to measure whether “prurient” material “offended the 
common conscience of the community by present-day standards.”  Roth v. United States, 354 
U.S. 476, 490 (1957). 
 94. Id. (“The test in each case is the effect of the book, picture or publication considered 
as a whole, not upon any particular class, but upon all those whom it is likely to reach.  In 
other words, you determine its impact upon the average person in the community.  The books, 
pictures and circulars must be judged as a whole, in their entire context, and you are not to 
consider detached or separate portions in reaching a conclusion). 
 95. David L. Hudson Jr., Pornography & Obscenity, FREEDOM FORUM INSTITUTE (July 
2009), https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/first-amendment-center/topics/freedom-of-sp 
eech-2/adult-entertainment/pornography-obscenity/. 
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following section examines how the courts balanced upholding First 
Amendment freedom of religion with the desire to preserve animal lives. 
The analysis balancing anti-animal cruelty statutes and the freedom of 
religion changed after the seminal Employment Division, Department of 
Human Resources v. Smith in which the Court upheld Oregon’s right to deny 
unemployment insurance to those using peyote for religious purposes.96  The 
Court found it immaterial that the use of peyote was considered criminal 
under the state law because the law was neutral and the effect of inhibiting 
any religious freedom was incidental.97  When the Court decided Stevens, it 
had been nearly twenty years since it had last heard a case involving the First 
Amendment and Free Exercise Clause. Prior to Smith in 1990, the Court was 
required to adhere to the “strict scrutiny” test—satisfaction of which requires 
the government to show that the law is narrowly tailored to further a 
compelling interest—to justify restricting speech or religion.98 
Smith established that a law must intentionally discriminate against a 
religious practice or have the effect of discriminating in order to be deemed 
invalid or unconstitutional.99  The Court determined that “neutral, generally 
applicable” criminal statutes need only pass the lower threshold of rational 
basis.100  “Neutral, generally applicable” statutes are likely to pass rational 
basis if their purpose is rationally related to a legitimate government interest.  
For example, a “neutral, generally applicable” law prohibiting certain 
slaughtering techniques on the grounds of animal cruelty would be 
constitutional under Smith because it lacks intentional motive to 
discriminate.  Therefore, applying the Smith reasoning would likely ensure 
that a more neutrally worded statute would only incidentally burden the right 
to free speech and thus be more likely to pass rational basis review. 
Three years after Smith, the Supreme Court decided the first seminal 
case involving an anti-animal cruelty statute and the freedom of religion. In 
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, the Court considered 
the question of whether laws preventing animal cruelty rose to the level of 
compelling state interest against the interests of followers seeking to 
preserve the ways of the Santeria religion.101  The Court in Lukumi 
overturned a city ordinance that banned intentional killings of chickens and 
goats for sacrificial ceremonies.  The Lukumi Court did not apply the Smith 
framework because the act facially discriminated against the Santeria 
 
 96. Emp. Division, Dep’t of Hum. Resources of Or. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660 (1990). 
 97. Id. at 885. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 676. 
 100. Id. at 665. 
 101. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. V. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
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religion rather than inadvertently, unlike the prohibition of peyote in 
Employment Division.102  The Court in Lukumi also refused to decide if the 
protection of animals was a “compelling interest.”103  The Court’s aversion 
to deciding this issue arises because the law treats animals differently in 
regard to their role and proximity to humans in society.  The Humane 
Slaughter Rule, for instance, protects grazing cattle but not chickens and 
turkeys.104  Since the law only protects certain animals from certain types of 
treatment and the societal interests in protecting animals differs depending 
on their purpose, determining if a compelling interest applies to all animals 
is difficult. 
In Stevens, the majority relied on Lukumi to make the case that 
depictions of animal abuse were not compelling enough to justify the First 
Amendment violations.  In his dissent, Alito distinguished the universally 
applicability of 18 U.S.C. § 48 criminalization of crush videos from the 
ordinance specifically tailored to target the Santeria religion in Lukumi. 
A more fact-specific inquiry could focus on existing laws, animals 
involved, and degree of public concern.  This means that prior case law on 
unprotected categories of speech allows finding one type of wanton cruelty 
or killing to be barred as a compelling interest while another form of killing 
is permitted.  The above section illustrates how the Supreme Court has 
interpreted laws designed to stop the harmful effects of intentional animal 
cruelty when such laws inhibit the Freedom of Religion. 
 
iii. An Argument for Regulating Depictions of Intentional Animal 
Cruelty as Commercial Speech 
 
There are nine officially recognized categories of speech not protected 
by the First Amendment.  These include obscenity, fighting words, 
defamation, perjury, blackmail, incitement of lawless action, actual threats, 
solicitation to commit a crime, and child pornography.105  Over the past fifty 
years, the Supreme Court has been increasingly less inclined to recognize 
new categories of unprotected speech.106  This trend is rooted in the Court’s 
 
 102. See generally Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
 103. Id. at 546–547. 
 104. See Cassuto, supra note 24, at 15. 
 105. KATHLEEN ANN RUANE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 95815, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND 
PRESS: EXCEPTIONS TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT, 1 (2010). 
 106. Chicago-Kent College of Law at Illinois Institute of Technology, Animal Cruelty, 
Crush Videos and US v. Stevens, YOUTUBE (July 25, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=vjwm-aQlrFE. 
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consideration of categories of speech based only on a tradition of 
proscription rather than what the legislature finds “shocking.”107 
Stevens changed the way a court determines if speech should be 
categorized as protected under the First Amendment,108 given its departure 
from the traditional cost-benefit balancing test used to gauge unprotectable 
obscenity speech.109  Consider the Court’s focus on the fact that depictions 
of animal cruelty do not have longstanding historical tradition of being 
prohibited.110  The majority’s reasoning did not consider that the statute may 
be a necessary step to ending the criminal practice of animal abuse.111 
Regulating the for-profit animal crush industry as “commercial speech” 
presents one option to make it easier for such laws to pass judicial review. 
This is because speech is considered commercial when it “regards solely the 
economic interests of the speaker and its audience.”112  Commercial speech 
has historically required that a statute meet “intermediate scrutiny.”113  This 
means that laws regulating commercial speech are valid if supported by 
“substantial” government interest and are not illegal or misleading.  The 
Supreme Court has found that commercial speech that which incites illegal 
activity, to be unprotected speech.114  For example, a “content-neutral” anti-
animal cruelty statute could pass judicial review if enacted with the purpose 
of targeting the commercial aspect of advertising and distributing all 
depictions of animal abuse that meet the definition of intentional criminal 
animal abuse under state law.  Therefore, categorizing animal crush videos 
as “commercial speech” given that they are profit-driven, advertised for to 
some degree, and highly likely to incite illegal activity creates one potential 
path to outlawing such videos. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 107. Ent. Merchants Ass’n., 564 U.S. at 792. 
 108. See, e.g., Charles W. Rhodes, The Historical Approach to Unprotected Speech and 
the Quantitative Analysis of Overbreadth, in United States v. Stevens, 2010 EMERGING ISSUES 
5227 (LexisNexis July 30, 2010). 
 109. See Cassuto, supra note 24. 
 110. See supra, note 86. 
 111. Cassuto, supra note 24 at 17. 
 112. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 
(1980). 
 113. Id. at 573. 
 114. Id. at 571–572. 
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D. Regulating Interstate Speech and the Commerce Clause 
 
The legislative record of section 48 illustrates that Congress’s intent to 
use its interstate commerce power to supplement the authority of the states 
to bring those who profit from animal abuse to justice.115  State law is nearly 
ineffective at regulating and criminalizing individuals who sell obscene 
content across jurisdictions over the internet because many crush videos are 
purposely made in anonymity to avoid identification for prosecution under 
animal cruelty laws.  Even if prosecutors are able to identify the actors, there 
is no way to verify where videos are made and whether they are within the 
applicable statute of limitations since it runs from the date the conduct 
occurred.116  More specifically, the statute of limitations to prosecute 
individuals under many state laws begins when the depiction of intentional 
abusive conduct was made or distributed and not.117  Therefore, the 
importance of a strong federal ban on depictions of inherent animal cruelty 
(that are also clearly produced for self-gratification purposes only) was 
necessary as the reach of state laws were largely ineffective. 
Congress has attempted to regulate obscenity on the internet in a 
number of ways.118  In 1996, Congress passed the Communications Decency 
Act of 1996, which was only partially upheld after Reno v. ACLU struck 
down parts of it down for clashing with the First Amendment.119  The Miller 
test (as discussed in Section C, supra) for obscenity was applied to material 
displayed on the Internet seven years before Stevens, when the Court ruled 
on the regulation of obscenity over the Internet.  In Ashcroft v. ACLU, the 
Child Online Protection Act (COPA) was challenged because it criminalized 
material that was legal for adults to view, thereby unconstitutionally chilling 
 
 115. See H.R. Rep. No. 106-397, at 8 (1999) (citing 145 CONG. REC. H10267-01 (daily 
ed. Oct. 19, 1999) (statement of Rep. McCollum) (discussing Congressional authority to 
regulate interstate commerce of illegal goods for profit)). 
 116. Shafer, supra note 59, at 283. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See, e.g., Am. Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding 
a New York statute unconstitutional for violating the Dormant Commerce Clause by 
regulating content accessible in other states under New York law).  The Pataki Court stated 
that criminalizing potentially legal user activities over the internet would violate regulatory 
powers that prohibit the government from exercising authority beyond its boundaries.  Id. at 
169.  This produced a chilling effect beyond the state’s ability to prosecute website owners, 
potentially resulting in the inconsistent and uncertain application of multiple states’ laws over 
the same content.  See also, PSInet, Inc. v. Chapman, 372 F.3d 227 (4th Cir. 2004) (finding a 
Virginia statute that banned the “knowing display for commercial purpose” of pornographic 
materials over the internet placed undue burden on interstate Commerce by restricting access 
to online materials in another state’s jurisdiction). 
 119. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 846-47 (1997). 
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speech.120  In Ashcroft, the Court recognized the importance of construing 
statutes in a modern lens, taking into account the use of local community 
standards.  The Supreme Court in that case found that COPA violated the 
First Amendment for condemning legal conduct and because the software 
did not protect children using the least restrictive means possible.121  The 
Court rejected, however, Respondent’s argument that the statute was 
overbroad where only “some” overbreadth was demonstrated, holding that 
any basis for overbreadth must be both real and substantial.122 
As a Federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 48 invokes the Commerce Clause 
because the statute attempts to regulate the distribution of commercial media 
for profits on interstate “channels” such as the internet.  Case law from the 
past two decades has swung against the regulation of online activities by 
statute under the intricacies of the Commerce Clause and Dormant 
Commerce Clause.123  Thus, federal statutes passed to regulate the 
transmission of obscene content on the internet (as 18 U.S.C. § 48) face 
another obstacles for being unconstitutional against state powers.  The 
passage of the latest form of 18 U.S.C. § 48 in 2019 clearly highlights the 
reliance on the Commerce Clause powers to regulate certain speech when 
necessary.124 
While many opponents of 18 U.S.C. § 48 initially claimed that state 
laws already made illegal the act itself, they failed to recognize the power of 
Congress to regulate mechanisms of interstate commerce.  Given the 
heightened ability to produce, disseminate, and sell content generally over 
the Internet today, the Commerce Clause can and has been used to regulate 
instrumentalities of trade, thus it was imperative for state legislators to 
incorporate the Clause’s principles into the latest version of 18 U.S.C. § 48 
(2019).  “PACT” as written today embraces the Commerce Clause and 
 
 120. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 568. (In that case, the Court of Appeals had 
difficulty interpreting a statute that imposed a $50,000 fine and six months in prison for the 
distribution of obscene material “harmful to minors” using the extremely broad “community 
standard” (also discussed above) because such a standard for obscenity varied greatly on 
internet.).  
 121. Id. at 571–572. 
 122. Id. at 584. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Cf. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 496 
(1982) (in Hoffman Estates, the Supreme Court ruled on an ordinance aimed at prohibited all 
marketing of drug paraphernalia unless the publisher possessed a license.  The owner of a 
paraphernalia store challenged the ordinance as vague and potentially overbroad.  The Court 
upheld the ordinance and refused to apply the overbreadth doctrine, reiterating that the 
overbreadth does not apply to the regulation of commercial speech.  This was because the 
language of the statute regulated only commercial marketing behavior and reiterated that the 
government may ban speech which proposes an illegal transaction.). 
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expressly prohibits both depictions of wanton abuse on federal property or 
in interstate commerce and the underlying act itself.  However, the federal 
act is still weak where it does not address the potential of criminalizing free 
speech even with the use of exceptions.  Finally, “PACT” does not rewrite 
the 2010 version, but only applies to depictions that are distributed in 
interstate commerce or on federal property, leaving some of the previous 
statute’s weaknesses exposed.  Even the most recent version of 18 U.S.C.  
§ 48 could be strengthened as a statute and pass judicial review if it instead 
aimed to regulate depictions made for profit for sale as “commercial speech,” 
which has historically been regulated according to intermediate scrutiny.125 
Speech is considered “commercial” when it regards commercial 
advertising, promises, and solicitations.126  This is because laws regulating 
commercial speech are valid if supported by “substantial” government 
interest and are not illegal or misleading.  The Supreme Court found in 1980 
that commercial speech which is misleading or promotes illegal activity is 
not protected by the First Amendment, even if only the underlying activity 
is banned.127  In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service 
Comm’n., the Court reiterated that laws regulating commercial speech as the 
offspring of economic self-interest and are not “particularly susceptible to 
being [invalidated] by overbroad regulation.”128  Because Congress used its 
Commerce Clause power in passing 18 U.S.C. § 48 (2019), future courts 
should approach distributions of animal crush videos as inherently 
“commercial” in their reasoning.  A more pragmatic anti-animal cruelty 
statute could expressly regulate the “commercial speech” aspect of 
advertising and distributing depictions, particularly because statutes that 
regulate commercial speech are incapable of being overbroad.129  Doing so 
may help resolve some of the loopholes created by having undefined 
“exceptions” where such depictions of animal crushing or abuse would be 
considered legal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 125. Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995). 
 126. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562 
(1980). 
 127. See id. at 563–564. 
 128. Id. at 564, n.6. 
 129. See Hudson, supra note 95. 
4 - Radford_HJCP_V1-2 5/13/2020  11:38 AM 
242 Hastings Journal of Crime and Punishment [Vol. 1:2 
E. Other Alternatives to Getting 18 U.S.C. § 48 around Judicial 
Review 
 
The Court in Stevens determined that the purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 48 did 
not satisfy a “compelling governmental interest” by a test normally applied 
only to depictions of child pornography rather than the traditional test for 
obscenity.  The following section explains why 18 U.S.C § 48 had such a 
high constitutional threshold to pass and discusses how restructuring the 
language of the state may help it pass judicial review in the future. 
Recall that the Court in Stevens did not find that preventing underlying 
crimes of animal abuse was enough to justify preserving the law, despite 
numerous amicus briefs, such as the one filed by Northwest Animal Rights 
Network, that articulated how criminalizing depictions of animal abuse was 
just as compelling as other unprotected types of speech.  The brief provided 
numerous examples of causal links between flagrant animal abuse and other 
types of violence against others, as well as why it is necessary for the federal 
government to have a carefully drafted legislative mechanism to ensure 
humane treatment of animals.  Rejecting these arguments, the Court was 
heavily persuaded by the fact that federal regulation of depictions of animal 
cruelty was less compelling because nearly every state already criminalizes 
intentional animal abuse. 
When legislators attempt to criminalize the depictions of speech, the 
federal government has the burden to prove their justification in inhibiting 
that speech.  Regulating an activity based on the content of the speech itself 
requires the government satisfy strict scrutiny.130  Part of the next challenge 
in reworking 18 U.S.C. § 48 will be to frame the statute in such a way so that 
it is not content-based but is content-neutral.  A law is content-neutral (and 
requires only intermediate scrutiny) when it applies to all expression without 
regard to the substance or message of expression.131  The content-neutrality 
of a statute is ensured if it regulates all intentional acts of criminal abuse 
under state law without criminalizing legal conduct. Redrafting 18 U.S.C. § 
48 to be neutrally applicable means a Court would be less inclined to strike 
it down for being overbroad. 
 
 
 130. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2228 (2015). 
 131. David L. Hudson Jr., Content Neutral, THE FIRST AMEND. ENCYCLOPEDIA  
(last visited May 2, 2020), https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/937/content-neutral 
(Intermediate scrutiny requires the government need only demonstrate that the regulation of 
speech is done for an important governmental purpose and is narrowly tailored to accomplish 
that purpose). 
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III. How Other Courts Have Interpreted Similar Laws that 
Impinge on Protected First Amendment Speech Rights  
 
There is a dearth of case law discussing how federal courts have ruled 
on the constitutionality of statutes criminalizing depictions of animal cruelty. 
To provide perspective, it is important to show how different statutes that 
attempt to criminalize the dissemination of obscene materials have fared 
under the law. 
 
A. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
 
The Sixth Circuit initially heard American Booksellers Foundation for 
Free Expression, et al. v. Ted Strickland, Richard Cordray, et al. to certify 
two questions of law as to the proper interpretation of Ohio Revised Code § 
2907.01 subparts (E) and (J).132  Subpart (E) prohibited the distribution or 
display of certain sexually explicit materials considered “harmful to 
juveniles” whereas subpart (D) prohibited the “[remote transmission] by 
means of a method of mass distribution.”133  The language of § 2907.01 was 
amended prior to appeal to explicitly state that the statute only applied to 
“personally directed” communications (such as instant messaging and chat 
rooms), not “generally accessible” communications (accessible publicly).134  
At the district level, Plaintiffs argued that both subparts of (D) were 
overbroad and resulted in chilling adult-to-adult speech, given that it was 
unclear when an individual would have knowledge of the legality of 
materials they were prosecuted for possessing.135  The district court found 
that the definition of “material harmful to minors” failed the Miller test 
because it also criminalized legal speech, such as adults in possession of such 
material.136  The Sixth Circuit certified both questions, and the outcome of 
both questions was resolved in 2010 by the Ohio Supreme Court, which held 
the statute should be limited in scope only to electronic communications that 
can be “personally directed” rather than means of mass distribution which 
do not allow a sender to prevent distribution to particular recipients.137 
The American Booksellers cases demonstrates that courts demand a 
greater level of certainty where a vague criminal statute may “induce 
 
 132. See generally Am. Booksellers Found. for Free Expression v. Strickland, 560 F.3d 
443, 446 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 133. Id. at 445–446. 
 134. Id. at 447. 
 135. Id. at 444. 
 136. Id. 
 137. See Am. Booksellers Found. v. Cordray, 124 Ohio St. 3d 329, 332. 
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individuals to forgo their rights of speech, press, and association” to avoid a 
threat of prosecution and chilling speech.138  
 
B. Florida  
 
In Gonzalez v. State, Defendant Sebastian Gonzalez was charged under 
Florida statute § 828.122(3)(h) for “knowingly” using an animal for the 
purpose of fighting another animal.  Mr. Gonzalez was the first to challenge 
the constitutionality of the statute on the grounds of overbreadth given that 
innocent bystanders lacking intent could also be prosecuted.139  The court 
used the reasoning from a similar Tennessee case to find the statute 
constitutional, in which the court distinguished from prohibiting knowingly 
being present at an animal fight from just being present at an unlawful animal 
fight.  Gonzalez also challenged the statutory language for failing to define 
“attend” and requested that the court construe the statute in his favor (Rule 
of Lenity).140  Ultimately, the court held that the statute was not vague 
because the language was clear and unambiguous, thus the “clear and plain 
meaning prevails.”141  Gonzalez demonstrated the importance of sufficiently 
articulating the level of intent required to penalize an individual for 
producing a depiction.142 
The statutory vagueness discussed in Gonzalez is similar to what the 
majority in Stevens latched on to in their reasoning.  The court in Gonzalez 
pointed out that the legislature’s choice of words such as “wound” and “kill” 
did not evince that depictions need to be of “cruel” nature to be criminal. 
Such broad language ultimately convinced the Court that the specific words 
used should be construed per their plain meanings to reduce the risk of 
 
 138. See also KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner, 647 F. Supp. 
2d 857, 888 (N.D. Ohio 2009). 
 139. Gonzalez v. State, 941 So. 2d 1226, 1227–28 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).  See also 
Kerry Adams, Punishing Depictions of Animal Cruelty: Unconstitutional or a Valid 
Restriction on Speech?, 12 BARRY L. REV. 203 (citing Complaint at 2, Advanced Consulting 
and Marketing Inc. v. Gonzales, No. 1:o7cv21767, 2007 WL 2049319 (S.D. Fla. July 10, 
2007)).  Advanced Consulting and Marketing Inc. v. Gonzales was among one of the first suits 
to challenge the constitutionality of banning depictions of conduct legal in another jurisdiction 
under 18 U.S.C. § 48.  Advance Consulting and Marketing Inc. represents the dilemma of 
criminalizing depictions accessible over the internet where the underlying conduct was legal 
where it was produced. 
 140. Gonzalez, 941 So. 2d at 1229 (explaining that the Rule of Lenity describes a tool of 
statutory interpretation where an ambiguity in language is so grievous the court must guess 
as to meaning).  See generally Barber v. Thomas, 560 U. S. 474, 488 (2010). 
 141. Gonzalez, 941 So. 2d at 1229. 
 142. Id. 
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convicting individuals for legal conduct.143  While the most current version 
of 18 U.S.C. § 48 does articulate the required mens rea as “purposefully,” 
Gonzalez also demonstrates that if the actual crime itself is not defined 
clearly, the Court must interpret the plain meaning in favor of the 
defendant.144  Appling the principle of clear statutory construction from 
Gonzalez to Stevens underscores the necessity for future versions of the 
statutes to focus on the specific type of intent needed and provide better 
definitions of intent for the Court. 
 
C. Pennsylvania 
 
In Pennsylvania, Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Sessions was the final 
decision of multiple cases regarding the First Amendment constitutionality 
of a statute that required producers of adult sexually explicit imagery to 
maintain detailed records of each performer.145  Although the cases did not 
concern depictions of animal cruelty, they involve the constitutionality of 
injunctions prohibiting depictions and overbreadth of the statute.  The 
District Court upheld injunctions in favor of the producer-Plaintiffs where it 
found certain provisions to be unconstitutional but ultimately rejected their 
facial overbreadth claim.146  The court concluded that there was no longer a 
clear dividing line between remedies that are proper when a statute is either 
“facially” unconstitutional or unconstitutional “as applied.”147  Analogizing 
to Stevens, in which the government in that case argued for a limited 
interpretation of “depictions of animal cruelty” to apply to only “extreme” 
animal cruelty, the Court in Free Speech Coalition (I) reasoned it could not 
engage in essentially “rewriting” statutes.148  Soon after, the Court in Free 
Speech Coalition (II) decided against limiting the reach of the statute and 
only upheld the provisions of the statute that were the least restrictive means 
of accomplishing the statute’s goals.  District Judge Michael Baylson 
described the difficulty of facial attacks to statutes for overbreadth stating, 
“there is no longer a strict dividing line between the relief that would be 
proper when a statute is facially unconstitutional, as opposed to a statute 
 
 143. See Shafer, supra note 59, at 314. 
 144. Gonzalez supra, note 135. 
 145. See generally Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Sessions, 322 F. Supp. 3d 605 (E.D. Pa. 
2018) (stating that the statute would have violated the test for substantive overbreadth by 
criminalizing adult entertainment professionals for legal conduct). 
 146. Id. at 612. 
 147. Free Speech Coal., Inc., F. Supp. 3d at 612 (E.D. Pa. 2018). 
 148. See Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. AG of the United States, 677 F.3d 519, 539 (3d Cir. 
2013). Cf. Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. AG United States, 787 F.3d 142. 
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being declared unconstitutional.”149  This grey area highlights the power the 
Court has to invalidate a statute entirely or limit its application on a case by 
case basis so that something of value may still come out of the decision.  If 
this reasoning had been applied to Stevens, the Court could have ruled on 
part of the statute rather than striking it down entirely for being overbroad. 
 
D. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
 
Following Stevens, the Fifth Circuit decided United States v. Richards, 
the reasoning of which reflected ongoing weaknesses of the 2010 revisions 
to 18 U.S.C. § 48.  The facts of Richards, unlike Stevens, involved the 
prosecution of animal crush videos where defendant Ashley Nicole Richards 
and her accomplice Brent Justice restrained animals and tortured them to 
death on camera while making sexually suggestive comments in the 
background.150  The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this argument 
and highlighted that § 48 fit within the “secondary effects” exception which 
permits a statute to regulate a content-based subclass based on its secondary 
effects, or the “wanton killing and torture” behind animal crush videos.151  In 
reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals extensively referred to the 
Congressional intent as a tool to narrow the proper interpretation of animal 
crush videos independent of traditional violence-obscenity statutes and 
worth of “special punishment.”152 
In deciding Richards, the court applied the Miller obscenity test 
(discussed previously) to the added “obscene” requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 
48, meaning conduct would be considered obscene if it met the three-part 
test for prurience.  The Court did not address the point raised by the majority 
in Stevens that depictions must be of sexual conduct.  This issue was raised 
three years later when the Fifth Circuit heard United States v. Justice in 2017. 
On appeal, the Court in Justice addressed in the appeal the narrower 
question of whether the depictions of animal crushing constituted sexual 
conduct in a patently offensive way.153  Defendant-cameraman Brent Justice 
argued that the depictions did not constitute an example of the patently 
offensive sexual conduct provided in Miller.154  The Court of Appeals 
concluded that the obscenity of the videos be factually evaluated case-by-
 
 149. Free Speech Coal., Inc., 322 F. Supp. 3d at 611. 
 150. United States v. Richards, 755 F.3d 269, 271–72 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 151. Id. at 277 (citing Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986)). 
 152. Id. at 277. 
 153. United States v. Justice, 703 Fed. App’x 345, 346 (5th Cir. 2017). 
 154. Id. 
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case in their totality.155  The Court upheld the conviction as to videos 
containing sexual conduct but vacated the count of one video that did not 
involve sexual conduct but was clearly created to appeal to prurient 
interests.156 
If the drafters of 18 U.S.C. § 48 had previously included a subjective 
prurient intent requirement, Justice’s argument would have likely been 
preempted before being heard on appeal.  This is because the intent behind 
the creation of the crush videos in question would likely have satisfied the 
above requirement and the Court would not have needed to address whether 
the conduct depicted was inherently “sexual” in nature.  Whereas the Court’s 
favorable interpretation of “obscene” under Miller permitted a more 
constitutional reading of the 18 U.S.C. § 48 in Richards, the subsequent 
acquittal of Defendant Justice demonstrates the ongoing need for 
strengthening the statute before it is challenged once again. 
 
IV.  Statutory Overbreadth and the Feasibility of Adding a  
Prurience Test to the Scienter Requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 48 
 
As was apparent in United States v. Richards (which challenged the 
obscenity of 18 U.S.C. § 48) the issue with statutory specificity still exists 
today in the language of the current proposed legislation to refine 18 U.S.C. 
§ 48.157  This issue presents a roadblock because no court has provided a tool 
for interpreting the statute’s vague “obscene” requirement.  Child 
pornography statutes, which contain the same “obscene” language, are won 
or lost based on the language of the statute.158  The following section 
discusses the background of statutory overbreadth, which is invoked when a 
statute impermissibly attempts to regulate obscene speech while incidentally 
regulating legal speech.  The next section also describes of the purpose of 
scienter requirements and how one such requirement may alleviate the 
constitutional problems of 18 U.S.C. § 48. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 155. Id. at 346–347. 
 156. Id. at 347. 
 157. See United States v. Richards, 940 F. Supp. 2d 548 (S.D. Tex. 2013). 
 158. Brian Verbon Cash, Images of Innocence or Guilt?: The Status of Laws Regulating 
Child Pornography on the Federal Level and in Alabama and an Evaluation of the Case 
Against Barnes & Noble, 51 ALA. L. REV. 793, 818 (2000). 
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A. Statutory Overbreadth and How to Resolve It 
 
The modern overbreadth doctrine permits defendants whose speech is 
not constitutionally protected to facially invalidate a statute on behalf of third 
parties whose speech may be chilled by the law in question.159  Laws that 
regulate substantially more speech than constitutionally prescribed are 
considered impermissibly overbroad.160  Historically, the Overbreadth 
Doctrine was viewed as either a “last resort” or heavily condemned,161 and 
facial overbreadth has not been applied when a limiting construction exists 
on the challenged statute.162  Following the Hughes Court (which handed 
down Thornhill v. Alabama163) and the “free-speech friendly” Warren Court, 
emerged the Burger Court, which adopted more aggressive approach of 
invalidating statutes on their face if they overstepped on speech interests.164 
The Court in Younger v. Harris restricted any court from enjoining the 
enforcement of a statute solely on the basis of a showing that the statute “on 
its face” impedes First Amendment rights (absent extraordinary 
circumstances), because doing so would contravene the basic functions of 
the judicial branch.165  In Younger, the Supreme Court invalidated a statute 
for overbreadth, ruling that the statute could not be enforced until the state’s 
courts provided a narrowing construction.166 
Statutory overbreadth threatens the constitutionality of many criminal 
statutes because it presents the risk of criminalizing individuals for legal 
conduct. In order to satisfy due process, a statute must be sufficiently definite 
in terms of the conduct it is regulating so that a reasonable person 
understands what the statute is prohibiting.167  Overbreadth of a statute must 
be resolved even before a court can consider whether an underlying crime or 
 
 159. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613–15 (1973).  
 160. See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008). 
 161. See L.A. Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 39 (1999). 
 162. See Williams, 553 U.S. 285, at 293; see also Richards, 940 F. Supp. 2d 548, at 614. 
 163. See generally Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (the Supreme Court carved 
out a protection for peaceful labor picketing speech even though situations where picketers 
marched with signs that went beyond the particular labor dispute would be heard again later 
by the Court). 
 164. Richard H. Fallon Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 863–864 
(1991).  See also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. (1971) (“We do not think that opinion stands 
for the proposition that a federal court can properly enjoin enforcement of a statute solely on 
the basis of a showing that the statute ’on its face’ abridges First Amendment rights.”). 
 165. Younger, 401 U.S. at 53. 
 166. Id. at 50–51. 
 167. Kathryn E. Brown, Stranger than Fiction: Modern Designer Drugs and the Federal 
Controlled Substances Analogue Act, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 449, 466 (2015). 
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conduct is compelling, which explains why the Court in Stevens spent a 
majority of its reasoning on the issue of surface validity but could not address 
the constitutional question presented. 
The doctrine of overbreadth is applied to laws by one of two 
approaches.168  When the government attempts to regulate speech based on 
its content, it must address whether the content falls within an already 
protected category. The Supreme Court has designated some categories of 
speech such as “fighting words” and “obscenity” to be beyond the purview 
of First Amendment protection, and the government may regulate or ban 
speech within these categories on the basis of content.169  The other approach 
is applied to laws that concern speech already fully protected under the First 
Amendment.  In those cases, even if the speech is harmful the state cannot 
regulate it based on content unless there it is necessary to advance a 
compelling government interest.170  Alternatively, a court will apply a more 
lenient “balancing” test when a regulation is neutral with respect to the 
content for the purpose of promoting interests unrelated to the message of 
regulated speech.171 
Overturning a statute for overbreadth is rare and often a last resort,172 
but the Court did so in Stevens because of the numerous hypotheticals 
raised.173  By focusing on the hypothetical unconstitutional applications, the 
Court never addressed the more important question of whether a law 
criminalizing crush videos could be constitutional.174  While the 
interpretation of some parts of 18 U.S.C. § 48 were clarified following 
Richards and again in Justice, the language of the statute still remains too 
broad. 
 
B.  The Doctrine and Purpose of “Scienter” Requirements in 
Criminal Statutes 
 
This article argues that the addition of a properly tailored scienter 
requirement to 18 U.S.C. § 48 would strengthen the goals of the statute’s 
purpose and help to accomplish the intent of Congress to prohibit animal 
cruelty for valueless entertainment. 
 
 168. Fallon, supra note 161, at 864. 
 169. Fallon, supra note 161, at 864. 
 170. Fallon, supra note 161, at 864–865. 
 171. Fallon, supra note 161, at 865. 
 172. LaBahn, supra note 47. 
 173. Shafer, supra note 59, at 330. 
 174. Shafer, supra note 59, at 325. 
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Many criminal statutes include an element of scienter that must be 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.175  The Supreme Court has determined 
the absence of a scienter requirement in an obscenity ordinance “may tend 
to work a substantial restriction on the freedom of speech and of the press.”176  
This highlights how important it is for certain criminal statutes to articulate 
the necessary mens rea to find individuals guilty.  Roth v. United States held 
that the conduct of the defendant is often of more importance than the 
obscenity of the material.177  Later, the Court in Ferber expressly did not 
include a scienter requirement in its five-part test, but provided that “criminal 
responsibility may not be imposed without some element of scienter on part 
of the defendant.”178 
The Supreme Court has determined the absence of a scienter 
requirement in an obscenity ordinance “may tend to work a substantial 
restriction on the freedom of speech and of the press.” This highlights how 
important it is for certain criminal statutes to articulate the necessary mens 
rea to find individuals guilty.  
 
C.  Assessing the Challenges of Including a Subjective “Prurient 
Intent” Element in 18 U.S.C. § 48 
 
Recall that the Department of Justice was instructed to narrowly 
construe the statute such that only videos of depictions that primarily 
appealed to salacious interests should be prosecuted.179  This section argues 
that redrafting the statute by manipulating the language of the scienter 
requirement further by specifically adding a “prurient intent” element would 
allow a Federal Court to more narrowly apply the statute in future cases. 
Also recall that the outcome of Stevens largely resulted from the statute 
failing to require “cruelty” in addition to requisite intent.180  As discussed 
above, even the most recent amendment of 18 U.S.C. § 48 still falls short of 
 
 175. Scienter, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining “scienter” as 
“defendant’s previous knowledge of the cause which lead to the injury complained of, or 
rather a defendant’s previous knowledge of a state of facts which it was his duty to guard 
against and his omission to do which has led to the injury complained of”). 
 176. Smith v. Cal., 361 U.S. 147, 150. 
 177. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 495 (1957) (Warren, C.J., concurring). 
 178. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765 (1982). 
 179. Kerry Adams, Punishing Depictions of Animal Cruelty: Unconstitutional or a Valid 
Restriction on Speech?, 12 BARRY L. REV. 1, 203, 221 (2009) (noting that “in President 
Clinton’s signing statement, he stated that the Justice Department should construe the law 
narrowly … [to limit it to] ‘wanton cruelty to animals designed to appeal to a prurient interest 
in sex’”). 
 180. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 474.  See 18 U.S.C.A. § 48 (2019). 
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defining what makes acts of animal cruelty “obscene.”181  This makes it 
incredibly hard for a Court to interpret actual intent without further direction, 
and without overstepping into a legislative role.  This issue with language 
interpretation is common in child pornography cases where, for example, the 
state law requires that material be “obscene” but does not define it.182  As a 
result, the burden on the prosecution to prove “obscene” is difficult when the 
defendant only needs to introduce reasonable doubt as to whether the facts 
meet that definition.183 
One Alabama case highlights the importance of an appropriately 
tailored scienter requirement when a statute involves the criminalization of 
“obscene” speech that is ill-defined and potentially criminalizes artistic 
expression.184  In 1998, Barnes & Noble was charged for possession of child 
pornography contained within two photo books stocked in the store, Radiant 
Identities and Age of Innocence.  Whereas Ferber established that child 
pornography was outside the scope of protection if it involved “scienter” and 
depiction of sexual conduct,185 Barnes & Noble argued the images were 
protected under the First Amendment for their redeeming artistic value. 
However, the Alabama child pornography statute in question (enacted two 
years after Ferber) modified the definition of “obscenity” to include 
depictions of breast nudity.186  Thus, the Court weighed evidence as to the 
intent of the authors behind the images to determine if images of simple 
nudity could be considered obscene.187  Even though the case was dismissed, 
the questions it raised regarding defining obscenity demonstrate how 
difficult it can be for a prosecutor to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant acted “knowingly,” their visual depictions are considered 
“lewd,” and whether those depictions are considered “obscene.”188 
Redefining the scienter requirement is essential because the majority in 
Stevens emphasized the lack of “prurient” conduct that was actually depicted 
 
 181. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 48 (2019); Stevens, 559 U.S. at 462. 
 182. Cash, supra note 151, at 804–805. 
 183. See generally Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 79 (1973) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (“Yet our efforts to implement that approach demonstrate that agreement on the 
existence of something called ‘obscenity’ is still a long and painful step from agreement on a 
workable definition of the term.”). 
 184. See generally Strickland, 560 F.3d at 446. 
 185. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 758; but cf. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (Determining what is 
“obscene” by means of a three-prong test, which consist of “applying contemporary local 
community standards, on the whole, appeals to the prurient interest; is patently offensive; and 
on the whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.”). 
 186. Cash, supra note 151, at 818. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 817. 
4 - Radford_HJCP_V1-2 5/13/2020  11:38 AM 
252 Hastings Journal of Crime and Punishment [Vol. 1:2 
in crush videos.  It is important to note the distinction between depictions of 
extreme animal cruelty from the facts of many child pornography cases, 
which requires the Court to instead evaluate a visual depiction for 
lewdness.189  This distinction between the subject matter of animal cruelty 
and human pornography presents the greatest challenge of adding a “prurient 
intent” element to the statute’s scienter requirement.  Even attempting to 
define obscenity in the context of animal cruelty poses a similar challenge 
because the Miller standard of obscenity defined above.  Recall that Miller 
requires not only that the work depicted appeals to prurient interests and 
lacks redeeming value, but also that the work depicts sexual conduct.190 
Next, it is important to examine case law that concerns the mental state 
of the actor to determine if they should be rightfully charged with a crime 
under statute.  The Supreme Court has more liberally interpreted the meaning 
of “lewd or lascivious” in statutes where the language has been challenged 
as being “too broad.”  Cases after Miller devised a multi-factor test for a trier 
of fact to determine if a visual depiction of a nude minor meets the 
“lascivious” standard.  One such federal case in California, U.S. v. Dost 
evaluated the multifactor test and determined that a trier of fact should need 
only find that at least one factor is met in order to find that the depiction is 
“lascivious.” 
Shortly after Dost, the Court in U.S. v. Wiegand shifted the onus from 
what was considered sexual conduct from the innocent minor depicted to the 
photographer (or videographer).  In that case the Court held that 
“lasciviousness is not a characteristic of the child photographed but of the 
exhibition” and that “[the photograph] was a lascivious exhibition because 
the photographer arrayed it to suit his particular lust.”191  Two years later, in 
U.S. v. Wolf, the Tenth Circuit interpreted the Dost factors and held that there 
was no required amount needed to prove sexual exploitation in a 
photograph.192  Useful application of the singular final Dost factor which 
states “whether the visual depiction is intended or designed to elicit a sexual 
response in the view” would require a court to acknowledge that the 
depiction of crush videos does not contain nudity, but exactly how such a 
connection between two types of obscenity should be made is a topic for 
future discussion. 
If adding a prurient intent element is to improve the success of 18 
U.S.C. § 48, a court must interpret a defendant-actor’s intent.  In 2000, a 
 
 189. See generally United States v. Nemuras, 567 F. Supp. 87 (D. Md. 1983) (the court 
had to determine whether certain photographs constituted a “lewd exhibition of the genitals”). 
 190. Miller, 413 U.S. at 15. 
 191. United States v. Wiegand, 812 F.2d 1239, 1244 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 192. United States v. Wolf, 890 F.2d 241, 246 (10th Cir. 1989). 
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New Jersey court convicted defendants of throwing away a barrel of 
chickens that inadvertently contained some still alive in State of New Jersey 
v. ISE Farms, Inc.193  On appeal, the Superior Court overturned the judgment 
on the basis that the defendants did not violate the law “knowingly,” stating 
that the New Jersey statute did not sufficiently state the requisite mental 
state.194  Unlike the lower court’s reasoning, the Superior Court’s analysis of 
the statute highlighted the lacking intent of the defendants.  Where the 
negligence of the defendant did not equate to recklessness, the defendants 
could not be held liable for animal cruelty.195 
 
D.  Proving How Adding an Enhanced “Prurient Intent” 
Requirement in 18 U.S.C. § 48 Would Make It Constitutionally 
Stronger 
 
In Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, the Supreme Court considered whether 
the language of “prurient interest” passed overbreadth.196  In that case, a 
Washington moral nuisance statute attempted to prohibit material 
specifically “appealing to a prurient interest,” which was defined as “inciting 
lasciviousness or lust.”197  The Ninth Circuit in that case viewed the entire 
statute as overbroad because the definition encompassed “lust,” or a normal 
interest in sex.  The Court condemned complete invalidity and was satisfied 
that statute was constitutional except to the extent that the statute punished 
legal conduct.198  The Court in its reasoning referred to the definition of 
prurient interest devised in Roth v. United States where “prurient interest” 
may be constitutionally defined for obscenity purposes as that which appeals 
to a shameful or morbid interest in sex.199  Essentially, if language that 
defines “prurient interest” was to be added to an amended version of 18 
U.S.C. § 48 the Supreme Court would be unable to strike down the entirety 
of the statute on that basis as it did in Stevens.  
 
 193. State of New Jersey v. ISE Farms, Inc. Transcript of Sup. Ct. Warren Co., (Mar. 8, 
2001). 
 194. State of New Jersey v. ISE Farms, Inc., Appeal No. A-45-00 (N.J. Sup. Ct., Law Div. 
Mar. 8, 2001); see also David J. Wolfson and Mariann Sullivan, Foxes in the Hen House: 
Animals, Agribusiness, and the Law: A Modern American Fable, in CASS R. SUNSTEIN AND 
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, EDS., ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS 205, 
207–208 (Oxford 2004). 
 195. Id. 
 196. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, 472 U.S. 491. 
 197. Id. (citing Missouri v. Becker, 364 Mo. 1079 (1954)). 
 198. Id. at 504–505. 
 199. Id. at 505. 
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As mentioned in Section C, simply adding statutory exceptions in a 
statute or requesting the Court limit application of a statute after-the-fact may 
not dissuade a particularly adamant individual from finding novel ways to 
work around the statute’s exceptions to find legal loopholes by classifying 
their depiction under “hunting” or “educational purposes.”  This means that, 
in another example, if someone pays workers in factory farms to film the 
crushing of animals considered to be a common practice exemption to 
cruelty, the act of selling those depictions later could be exempt from the 
current statute because doing so would easily fall under an exception.  For 
this reason, an enhanced scienter requirement could make it easier for 
prosecutors to determine if appropriate level of mental state to find conduct 
liable as animal cruelty.  Another example of this could be adding language 
that highlights conduct must be taken as a whole to meet a “prurient interest” 
test in order for it to satisfy the “obscene” element of 18 U.S.C. § 48 
(f)(2)(B). 
If a “prurient intent” scienter requirement based on standards similar to 
child pornography case law discussed above is added, it would require a trier 
of fact to apply a “totality of circumstances” approach to infer the intent of 
the producer.200  This “totality of the circumstances” approach would also 
function better than a standard scienter element because it would require the 
use of circumstantial evidence to better assess whether the purpose of 
recording an intentional killing was done to inflict pain for prurient 
gratification to serve a justifiable legal means.  
One strong example of a criminal statute with such a “prurient intent” 
element is Maryland Criminal Law Code § 3-902, which prohibits the “video 
surveillance of another in a private place with a prurient intent” and requires 
the State to satisfy the burden of proof by providing circumstantial evidence 
of such intent.201  The statute clarifies that video surveillance done 
intentionally but without a prurient intent is only actionable under tort law 
as an unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion.202  In this case, the prurient 
intent was demonstrated in the form of admissible evidence surrounding the 
crime such as prior similar acts and internet search history.  This was seen in 
Bickford v. State, where the Court admitted evidence of a defendant’s 
Internet history that was probative of prurient intent despite the defendant’s 
objection that such evidence was highly prejudicial.203 
 
 200. Id. 
 201. Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 3-902. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Bickford v. State, No. 95, 2018 Md. App. LEXIS 471, at 23 (App. May 15, 2018).  See 
also State v. Kula, 908 N.W.2d 539 (Iowa Ct. App. 2017) (“[t]he State appears to have 
carefully restricted its evidence so as to offer only that information necessary to prove […] 
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In order to charge a defendant for a crime that requires knowledge of 
intent, it is germane to closely scrutinize circumstantial evidence related to 
the motive of the depicter of animal crush videos.204  Proper use of 
circumstantial evidence is important in child pornography cases where a 
possessor or depicter of material may lack the same prurient intent as another 
individual who would use it for their sexual gratification.  Measuring the 
subjective prurient intent of a defendant is similarly important as applied to 
anti-animal cruelty depictions because a depicter may not be motivated to 
sell their depiction to others for sexual titillation purposes.205  The Supreme 
Court has held the government is not required to present expert testimony to 
prove obscenity,206 but the Second Circuit in United States v. Petrov clarified 
that in instances where the sexual nature of the obscene material is not 
immediately apparent, expert testimony may be used to show how the 
material appeals to the prurient interests of deviant segments of society.207  
Petrov established that the government must identify the deviant group, it 
must establish that the material appeals to the group’s prurient interests.208  
This was similarly at issue in United States v. Ragsdale where the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the government did not need to prove 
that a jury was qualified to determine if videotapes sold by defendants 
offended local standards.209  The reasoning by the court in Ragsdale 
demonstrates that a government proving the guilt an individual found 
violating 18 U.S.C.§ 48 for depicting animal crush videos would not need 
the use of expert testimony, making the case for prosecution easier. 
The following statute contains a “prurient intent” element as one 
example legislators may take into consideration in revising 18 U.S.C. § 48. 
Maryland Criminal Law Code § 3-902 criminalizes “video surveillance of 
another in a private place with a prurient intent” and requires the State to 
provide evidence of such intent.210  The statute clarifies that video 
surveillance done intentionally but without a prurient intent is only 
 
that he did these acts intentionally rather than accidentally, and that he acted with the intent 
to satisfy his own sexual desires or those of another”). 
 204. See Commonwealth v. Davidson, 595 Pa. 1, 43 (2007). 
 205. Id. 
 206. See Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 121 (1973). 
 207. See United States v. Petrov, 747 F.2d 824, 830 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 208. Id. 
 209. See United States v. Ragsdale, 426 F.3d 765, 785 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 210. See Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 3-902; see also State v. Kula, 908 N.W.2d 539 
(Iowa Ct. App. 2017) (“The State appears to have carefully restricted its evidence so as to 
offer only that information necessary to prove […] that he did these acts intentionally rather 
than accidentally, and that he acted with the intent to satisfy his own sexual desires or those 
of another.”). 
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actionable under tort law as an unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion.211  
The statute provides the criminal scope of the statute is limited only to 
individuals with prurient intent.212  Such an element of prurient intent could 
be adapted under the section (b) “Extraterritorial application” of 18 U.S.C. § 
48 section (b) to read: 
 
( 1 ) Creation of animal crush videos.  
“–It shall be unlawful for any person, with [prurient intent], 
to knowingly create or procure any depiction of animal crushing 
featuring the infliction of bodily injury, death, or torture on an 
animal.” 
 
( 1 ) … 
[( A ) The person engaging in such conduct intends or has 
reason to know that the animal crush video will derive sexual 
pleasure or gratification from inflicting death, bodily injury, or 
physical pain on another person.]213 
 
or, similarly, within section (f) “Definitions” as: 
 
(4) “Prurient Intent” is defined as the intent to arouse, 
appeal to, or gratify the sexual desire of any person.214 
 
Therefore, the central argument of this article posits that implementing 
a prurient intent requirement into 18 U.S.C. § 48 would provide the federal 
government with interpretation tools necessary to differentiate between 
depictions of animals in pain made with the deliberate intent to cause 
unwarranted suffering without intrinsic purpose.  Using already-existing 
statutes for reference, as shown above, the value of inserting a specific 
prurient intent element would make it much clearer for courts to understand 
how to interpret the intent of an individual.  Thus, targeting specific conduct 
that “appealing to sexual interests” through an enhanced scienter 
 
 211. Id. 
 212. See Harleysville Preferred Ins. Co. v. Rams Head Savage Mill, LLC, 237 Md. App. 
705. 
 213. See Cal. Evid. Code §1108 (defining “sexual offense” as “[d]eriving sexual pleasure 
or gratification from the infliction of death, bodily injury, or physical pain on another person). 
 214. Cf. 18 U.S.C.S. § 920(g)(2) (”sexual contact” defined as “touching … with an intent 
to abuse, humiliate, harass, or degrade any person or to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of 
any person …”). 
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requirement would work to eliminate the chance of wrongfully convicting 
individuals for their depictions. 
Enhancing the statutory framework of 18 U.S.C. § 48 has the potential 
to overcome some of the First Amendment challenges seen in Stevens, 
Richards, and Justice.  The above sections have demonstrated the use of 
scienter requirements in criminal statutes as one means to resolve the First 
Amendment challenges seen in those three cases.  Finally, other criminal 
statutes have demonstrated how a prurient intent element would be used to 
resolve the statutory overbreadth problem to be more precisely prosecute 
individuals who continue to participate in the production of animal crush 
videos. 
 
V.  Substituting Incarceration with Non-Penal, Therapeutic 
Solutions for Offenders of 18 U.S.C. § 48 and Beyond 
 
Rehabilitation functions as one of four goals (along with retribution, 
deterrence, and incapacitation) historically viewed by criminal scholars as 
justification for imposing criminal sentences.  Rehabilitation, put plainly, 
seeks to modify offender’s behavior so they will not continue to commit 
crime in the future.215  Until the final quarter of the twentieth century, the 
rehabilitative model of sentencing was viewed as the primary means to 
justify incarceration.216  By the 1980s, rehabilitation had been abandoned for 
a punishment-driven approach to sentencing that replaced the rehabilitation 
model in most jurisdictions.217 
It is undeniable that efforts to rehabilitate offenders of 18 U.S.C. § 48, 
or any animal abuse statute for that matter, have been largely secondary to 
the aggressive prosecution tactics aimed at targeting animal abusers. Today, 
there is growing consensus that the outcomes of strict prosecution of those 
guilty of animal abuse is misleading and overstated.218  An increasing 
number of animal rights advocates are criticizing the role of incarceration as 
“not the unmitigated good for society” that it was thought to be a generation 
ago.219  For example, the litigation approach used to target animal abuse in 
factory farms has resulted in overwhelmingly prosecuting low-income, 
people of color, many of whom are deported because of uncertain 
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 216. Robert G. Lawson, Difficult Times in Kentucky Corrections-Aftershocks of a “Tough 
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 217. Id. at 316. 
 218. JUSTIN MARCEAU, BEYOND CAGES: ANIMAL LAW AND CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT (2019). 
 219. Id. at 255. 
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immigration status.220  Again others in the animal protection movement 
argue that criminal intervention is necessary to prosecute harshly to put an 
animal abuser on the radar of law enforcement and prevent future 
violence.221  In reality, there is little data to support the notion that 
convictions alone are sufficient interventions for protecting animals and even 
humans from future harm.222  Further, while there exist animal cruelty laws 
in all fifty states, there has been no push to implement mandatory treatment 
or reporting, which does not exist in a single state.223  An emerging body of 
research in effective counseling and interventions for animal cruelty includes 
treatment plans that include animal-assisted therapy to provide a way for an 
animal abuser to reintegrate into society and develop empathy.224  Given that 
psychologists have recognized many offenders of wanton animal abuse 
suffer from psychological disorders, penalizing an individual by locking 
them away in jail acts as a denial of treatment and imposes additional 
stressors. 
Regardless of how 18 U.S.C. § 48 is interpreted in the future, courts 
will need to recognize that the appropriate treatment of offenders is far more 
important than incarceration, which tends to increase future criminality. 
While punishment retains some embodiment of a necessary evil, increasing 
incarceration is unlikely to ensure the protection of animals and mental 
health of their human counterparts.225  Current legislation that heightens an 
animal abuse crime from a misdemeanor to a felony increasing the number 
of incarcerable years will accomplish little without data-based treatment 
procedures that are uniformly and consistently applied. Future scholarship 
on this issue must focus on not only how to better identify actual animal 
abusers, as much of this Article does, but also how courts can better 
implement mandatory and practical treatment instead of mandatory prison 
terms to circumvent the underlying abusive behavior.  
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 221. Id. at 256. 
 222. Id. at 257. 
 223. Id. at 247. 
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VI. Conclusion 
 
A growing body of research indicates the psychological harm suffered 
by those who engage in wanton animal cruelty for the purposes of causing 
pain.226  Such research has shown that legitimizing the access to video 
depictions by nonenforcement is likely to lead vulnerable individuals to 
commit acts of criminal cruelty.227  As stated above, this warrants further 
legislative action into finding novel treatments courts can impose on or those 
who produce animal crush content to avoid future recidivism and 
overcriminalization. 
There is also an undeniably compelling need to address the profiting 
aspect of committing untraceable illegal acts of animal cruelty.  If regulating 
the trade of crush videos cannot be regulated as commercial speech, 
legislators must work diligently to add an enhanced prurience-based scienter 
requirement which will preempt any attempts at veiling conduct as having 
any entertainment value, such as hunting or documentary. 
Anti-animal cruelty legislation seeks to prevent the deliberate or willful 
mistreatment of animals by imposing criminal sanctions for jeopardizing 
animal welfare.228  Criminalizing any depiction of blatant animal abuse is a 
necessity to uphold nonhuman animal rights.  As the article has discussed, 
doing so is easier said than done.  Case law emerging from 18 U.S.C. § 48 
has been unfavorable in preventing depictions of animal cruelty because 
Section 48 has proven to be constitutionally weak, and thus subject to 
invalidation.  One course of action around the Court’s reluctance to create 
new categories of unprotected speech in this area would be the addition of a 
“prurient intent” element to the statute. 
Therefore, until the Court recognizes depictions of animal abuse as a 
novel unprotected category of speech, purveyors of animal crush videos will 
continue to make legal profits at the expense of animal lives.  This article has 
argued one workable solution, which is that 18 U.S.C. § 48 must be finely 
tuned elsewhere—likely with a prurient intent element that targets the mens 
rea of the offender.  Such an element presents a less restrictive, content-
neutral option than wholly banning distributing depictions of wanton animal 
cruelty. 
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It is imperative that the legislature addresses the constitutional 
weaknesses of 18 U.S.C. § 48 and attempts to draft a more precise version.  
The longer the statute takes to be redrafted, the more likely offenders will 
continue heinous acts of depicting abuse and escape prosecution.  Until then, 
animal crushing for broadcast entertainment will remain legal.229  As the 
nether corners of the Internet continue to elude the purview of state law, 
federal statutory enforcement must step up and restrict depictions for sexual 
or gratification purposes.  
 
 
 229. Networks such as the Discovery Channel are notorious for broadcasting the killing 
and crushing of animals for airing on survival shows such as “Man vs. Wild.”  Michael 
Mountain, Discovery Channel’s Crush Videos, ALL CREATURES (Oct. 2010), https://www.all-
creatures.org/articles/ar-channel.html. 
